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This paper evaluates factors responsible for the competitiveness of China in the world economy and 
relative to its East Asian rivals.  China has been highly successful in capturing world export markets.  
Chinese competitiveness is not just a matter of an undervalued exchange and extremely low labor costs.  It 
reflects primarily the coincidence of favorable cost conditions with improvements in China’s ability to 
produce products that meet world market specifications.  These improvements are closely related to foreign 
participation in China’s economy through foreign direct investment and joint venture enterprises. 
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Why Is China So Competitive? 
Measuring and Explaining China’s Competitiveness  
 
 
 
In the past decade, the export performance of the Chinese economy has been phenomenal.  The 
issue of Chinese competitiveness has expanded in scope from a regional question—“Why is China so 
competitive with respect to other East Asian exporters?”—to a worldwide question—“Why are Chinese 
goods so competitive in the world market? “ 
Some observers have expressed concern about the growing centralization of the world’s 
manufacturing production in East Asia, and particularly in China.  At issue are the implications for 
manufacturing employment and wages in the United States, Europe, and Japan where a large fraction of 
Chinese exports is directed.  There has also been worry about the deflationary implications of cheap 
Chinese exports on the advanced countries?  For example, a recent Japanese comment: “A situation, largely 
without precedent in the industrialization of other nations, is thus unfolding in China where there has been 
long-term economic growth without rising wages.  Judging from the large surplus [of] labor in the 
hinterland, this situation could continue for about another decade.  If so, the deflationary pressure on the 
global economy from China will continue. “ (Kojima, 2002, p.22.)  In the United States, China’s exchange 
rate and its implications for (unfair?) competition have become a political issue as the US trade deficit with 
China has risen above $100 billion.  In East Asia, China’s competitiveness is being seen as responsible for 
shifts in production and foreign investment that have impeded growth in other countries in the region.   
 3
The present debate over Chinese competitiveness is reminiscent of 1980s worries about the 
American competitive losses to Japan.   Yet, there are some important differences.  In the 1980s, American 
concerns were of an increasingly wealthy Japanese economy that appeared poised to overtake the US as a 
leader in key technologies and in overall wealth and prestige (Prestowitz, 1988).  In the current situation, it 
is instead the multinational corporations of the United States, Japan, and other advanced economies who 
are shifting their own production into China either through foreign direct investment or outsourcing.  The 
issues are less about technological supremacy than they are about the implications for developed country 
economies of a continuing outflow of investment and labor market displacements from the associated shifts 
in production and trade. 
Our primary concern will be about whether the phenomenon of Chinese competitiveness is 
primarily one of exchange rate undervaluation—that can presumably be remedied by appreciation of the 
Chinese exchange rate.  Or, alternatively, does Chinese competitiveness reflect more fundamental changes 
in the production  possibilities of a “new” Chinese economy? 
This paper considers China’s competitiveness, its definition and measurement.   In the next section 
we look at China’s success in capturing world export markets.  We then turn to a conceptual discussion of 
competitiveness and the practical challenges involved in its measurement.  The following section looks at 
empirical indicators of Chinese competitiveness.  An evaluation section summarizes findings and draws 
some tentative conclusions. 
 
Chinese Export Performance 
We begin by asking whether China has indeed been successful in its pursuit of international 
markets.  In recent years, the record of Chinese exports has been spectacular, though cyclical. (Figure 1) 
Chinese exports have expanded in some years by 20 to 30 percent.  Other East Asian countries have also 
shown rapid export growth but, despite substantial devaluations, in recent years many have lagged behind 
China (Table 1) In 2002, China accounted for $326 billion of exports, about 5 percent of world exports.   
More recently Chinese exports have grown exceptionally rapidly, by 22.3% in 2002 and, 
apparently, at an even faster rate in 2003.  Chinese exports were destined particularly to the United States, 
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growing at 15.6% per year from 1992 to 2001  While growth of Chinese exports to the European Union 
was slower, growth of exports to Japan was also rapid, 10.6% per year in the 1992-2001 period.  
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Chinese imports have also grown rapidly, but the Chinese trade balance has been substantially 
positive, amounting to approximately 10% of China’s trade since 1994.  
 An alternative way to evaluate the development of exports is to see them as a share of world trade 
(Table 3).  The results are striking.  China has shown a steadily increasing share of world exports.2  Other 
East Asian countries show steady increases in their shares of world trade until 1995 and stable or slightly 
declining shares thereafter. Japan shows a growing market share until 1990, but loses share thereafter, 
presumably to East Asian competition.  The United States shows substantial declines in market share 
(except in 1995-2000), and, in relative terms, now plays a considerably smaller role in world export 
markets than in 1970.  
 
 
                                                          
2  Together China and Hong Kong account for 8.1% of world exports and 41 % of East Asian exports (except Japan)   However, an 
important part of Hong Kong’s exports represent re-exports of products produced in China. 
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Table 1:  Exports 1970-2002 (billions of 
US $)  
       
 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2002 
       
World 298.4 1921.8 3377.6 5079.1 6387.5 6478 
       
China 2.3 18.1 62.1 148.8 249.2 326 
Hong Kong 2.5 19.8 82.2 173.8 201.9 200.1 
       
S. Korea 0.8 17.5 65 125.1 172.3 162.8 
Malaysia 1.7 11.1 29.4 74.1 98.2 88 
Philippines 1 5.7 8.1 17.5 39.8 32.7 
Thailand 0.7 6.5 23.1 56.5 69.1 65.1 
Singapore 1.6 19.4 52.8 118.3 137.8 125.2 
Indonesia 1.1 25.2 25.7 45.5 62.1 57.4 
Taiwan 1.4 19.8 76.1 111.6 147.8 124 
       
Japan 19.3 130.4 287.6 443.1 479.2 417.4 
US 42.7 225.6 393.6 584.7 781.1 693.9 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
    
    
    
  Table 2: Export Growth 1970-2002  
   (percent change p.a.)   
      
  1970-1980 1980-19901990-19951995-2000 2000-2002
       
World  18.63% 11.28% 8.16% 4.58% 0.70%
   
China  20.63% 12.33% 17.48% 10.31% 13.43%
Hong Kong  20.69% 14.23% 14.97% 3.00% -0.45%
   
S. Korea  30.85% 13.12% 13.09% 6.40% -2.84%
Malaysia  18.76% 9.74% 18.49% 5.63% -5.48%
Philippines 17.40% 3.51% 15.41% 16.43% -9.82%
Thailand  22.28% 12.68% 17.89% 4.03% -2.98%
Singapore  24.95% 10.01% 16.13% 3.05% -4.79%
Indonesia  31.32% 0.20% 11.42% 6.22% -3.94%
Taiwan  26.49% 13.46% 7.66% 5.62% -8.78%
   
Japan  19.11% 7.91% 8.64% 1.57% -6.90%
US  16.65% 5.57% 7.92% 5.79% -5.92%
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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  Table 3: Shares of World Exports (percent)  
       
 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2002
       
China 0.77% 0.94% 1.84% 2.93% 3.90% 5.03%
 Hong Kong 0.84% 1.03% 2.43% 3.42% 3.16% 3.09%
       
S. Korea 0.27% 0.91% 1.92% 2.46% 2.70% 2.51%
Malaysia 0.57% 0.58% 0.87% 1.46% 1.54% 1.36%
Philippines 0.34% 0.30% 0.24% 0.34% 0.62% 0.50%
Thailand 0.23% 0.34% 0.68% 1.11% 1.08% 1.00%
Singapore 0.54% 1.01% 1.56% 2.33% 2.16% 1.93%
Indonesia 0.37% 1.31% 0.76% 0.90% 0.97% 0.89%
Taiwan 0.47% 1.03% 2.25% 2.20% 2.31% 1.91%
       
Japan 6.47% 6.79% 8.51% 8.72% 7.50% 6.44%
US 14.31% 11.74% 11.65% 11.51% 12.23% 10.71%
Computed from IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 
The composition the exports of China and other East Asian countries (Table 4) provides some 
insight into the changing role of China in the world economy.  Export composition reflects the traditional 
development ladder (Adams and Ichimura, 1998, Vernon, 1966) approach, starting with foodstuffs in the 
lowest income countries, then increasing strongly in the manufactured mass production products and finally 
turning to high tech and capital goods as the economy’s productive power matures.  Among the East Asian 
countries, China is the region’s dominant exporter (China alone accounts for one third of the region’s 
exports, over half if China and Hong Kong are combined.).  While China’s exports of manufactured mass 
production products continue to increase rapidly. 6.9 % per year in line with world market growth, more 
than in other East Asian countries, high technology exports were increasing at a rate of 15 % per year and 
already represented a  43% (China and Hong Kong) share of 2001 East Asian high tech exports even 
though China was not yet as technologically advanced as Korea or Singapore.3  Since 2001 these patterns 
have continued.  
                                                          
3 Comparable statistics were not available for Taiwan. 
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   Table 4 Growth of Exports 1995-2001 by merchandise class 
    China Hong Kong Indonesia Korea 
    Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01
 1 Raw food  12,777 4.2% 2,304 -2.9% 3,252 -1.6% 2,204 -3.0%
 2 Proc. Agric. Products  5,156 -3.0% 3,098 -9.5% 4,595 -6.1% 1,896 -0.5%
 3 Fuels  8,405 7.6% 495 -20.4% 14,274 3.6% 8,038 19.6%
 4 Industrial Materials  29,421 5.6% 15,724 -2.7% 4,630 7.1% 22,801 2.9%
 5 Manufactures, mass production.  85,857 6.9% 56,566 -0.2% 17,164 1.8% 22,003 -2.0%
 6 High Tech & Capital Goods  122,080 15.0% 112,944 4.1% 11,070 12.4% 93,492 3.9%
  Total  263,696 9.5% 191,131 1.6% 54,986 3.2% 148,316 3.2%
    Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
    Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01
 1 Raw food  1,734 -0.6% 1,302 -0.4% 1,547 -49.3% 9,712 -0.7%
 2 Processed Agric. Products  5,571 -9.6% 889 -7.8% 2,093 -10.0% 2,670 -4.0%
 3 Fuels  8,557 8.4% 272 -0.2% 9,243 2.2% 1,814 24.8%
 4 Industrial Materials  6,124 6.1% 852 -0.9% 12,296 1.8% 5,757 8.2%
 5 Manufactures, mass production  7,663 -0.6% 3,839 9.2% 4,082 -4.6% 11,555 -3.0%
 6 High Tech & Capital Goods  58,355 4.5% 24,995 13.2% 91,919 0.9% 33,606 5.3%
  Total  88,004 2.9% 32,150 10.2% 121,179 -3.0% 62,204 2.8%
  Source: United Nations Comtrade          
 
A more detailed look is obtained by selecting sectors that can be called high tech and low tech at the 
“two digit” SITC level (Table 5).  High tech exports from China like office machines, telecom, electric 
machinery and parts have been growing much more rapidly than traditional Chinese export products like 
clothing and footwear, though the latter remain quantitatively important. Hong Kong and Korea also show 
very rapid growth for telecom and Malaysia and Singapore for ADP.  The growing high tech categories in 
China probably include a disproportionate share of relatively simple products, such as PCs and cell phones 
as well as parts, rather than highly sophisticated complex capital goods and chips.4  Some of these exports 
represent a shift of production from neighboring countries, especially Taiwan and South Korea where costs 
have been rising. Growth in the traditional sectors is generally more modest, though  China shows rapid 
growth in the clothing category.  
                                                          
4 For example the 3-digit category 776 (Transistors and valves) accounts for $4.9 billion, though it too is growing rapidly at 22.3% per 
year. 
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   Table 5 Growth of Exports 1995-2002, selected sectors  
   China Hong Kong Indonesia Korea 
High Tech Sectors  Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01
SITC 75 Office machines, ADP  $23,572 26.5% $17,747 10.0% $2,063 23.6% $28,534 -4.5%
SITC 76 Telecom  $16,770 14.1% $7,041 46.1% $27,230 -1.0% $13,499 16.7%
SITC 77 Elec Machinery, Parts  $23,759 17.3% $18,697 1.8% $3,354 12.0% $24,187 -2.6%
Low Tech Sectors          
SITC 83 Travel goods, handbags,  $12,170 -0.2% $1,140 5.8% $7,260 -9.7% $15,944 9.8%
SITC 84 Clothing and accessories  $25,998 16.7% $30,655 7.5% $2,280 17.3% $60,430 -3.4%
SITC 85 Footwear  $20,937 4.2% $14,385 30.5% $34,717 5.1% $21,406 -4.8%
SITC 89 Misc. Manufactures  $4,378 -0.9% $187 12.0% $34 -2.1% $19 -13.4%
   Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
High Tech Sectors  Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01 Mill of US $ %pa95-01
SITC 75 Office machines, ADP  $270 14.9% $38 -8.0% $233 -17.9% $441 -0.4%
SITC 76 Telecom  $36,743 7.0% $23,551 1.6% $4,599 4.8% $484 -2.1%
SITC 77 Elec Machinery, Parts  $2,071 -1.5% $2,423 13.3% $1,632 1.8% $4,320 -2.4%
Low Tech Sectors          
SITC 83 Travel goods, handbags,  $9,676 7.2% $5,575 -4.7% $1,474 -5.1% $29 -16.7%
SITC 84 Clothing and accessories  $84 -4.1% $72 -12.6% $112 -1.7% $352 -21.1%
SITC 85 Footwear  $22,085 7.9% $22,350 1.0% $1,181 0.7% $9,724 -0.8%
SITC 89 Misc. Manufactures  $2,014 1.1% $514 -0.8% $4,552 4.4% $4,034 -0.3%
 
It is not possible statistically to measure the qualitative improvements that have increased the 
competitiveness of Chinese products.  But, changes in the range of products being produced are suggestive 
of the developments that are taking place.5    
 To summarize, in comparison to other East Asian countries, China has become the dominant exporter 
and is increasingly shifting into the high tech sectors.  It is important to note, however, that the high tech 
categories contain not only advanced technology but also simpler assembly activities required to build high 
tech products like telephones and PCs, an important part of Chinese export production.  
 
  
Comparative Advantage and International Competitiveness 
The explanation of international competitiveness by economists goes back many years to the theory of 
comparative advantage and factor pricing (Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin).  While Ricardo focused on one 
                                                          
5 Among recent articles that have documented China’s export gains in capital-intensive and high tech export markets are Wong and 
Chan (2002), Chen (2001), and Voon and Yue (2003). 
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production factor and differences in technology (climate), Heckscher and Ohlin dealt with labor and capital 
inputs and justified comparative advantage on the basis of underlying differences in factor endowments and 
relative factor prices.  This approach has been extended to many products and many factors (Dornbusch, 
Fisher, and Samuelson, 1977).  In the modern theory of trade under imperfect competition, comparative 
advantage continues to play a central role in explaining trade patterns, although scale economies and 
strategic motives are also important (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).  Ronald Jones (2000) has noted that 
absolute advantages may influence patterns of specialization if some inputs to production are mobile across 
borders. 
Comparative advantage may lie at the heart of the theory of specialization and trade but it is not always 
closely related to real world discussions of competitiveness.  First, comparative advantage is a 
microeconomic concept, focusing on industry-specific trade, explaining why one country might export 
labor-intensive products while another country might specialize in capital-intensive ones.  By definition 
each country has a comparative advantage in the production of some products—those for which it has a 
lower relative (opportunity) cost than its competitors.  Therefore, comparative advantage has little 
significance from a macroeconomic perspective.  It is not meaningful to say that at any time country A in 
the aggregate has a comparative advantage over country B.  
Second, comparative advantage is an equilibrium concept, predicting a pattern of trade when prices, 
trade flows and exchange rates are in equilibrium.  Business decisions, in contrast, often must explicitly 
consider short-term developments as well as long term equilibrium outcomes.  These will include current 
economic conditions, exchange rate fluctuations, and other factors that represent deviations from long-run 
equilibrium conditions. 
Finally comparative advantage does not take  specifically into account all the technological options 
available to the producers.  At the microeconomic level, when dealing with specific products, it is not 
always clear from theory which country has the most favorable mix of resources and factor prices for 
various types of production.  Depending on technology and infrastructure, a shortage of labor relative to 
capital which implies relatively high wage rates may be offset by differences in productivity.  High wages 
may or may not translate into competitive disadvantage for labor-intensive products if alternative 
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technologies using less labor and more capital are available. For example, many products that are produced 
by hand in China are also produced, by machine, in the United States.   
Competitiveness, a term used widely in the business administration literature (Porter, 1990), has been 
often been applied in Europe and the US to represent the failures or successes of the economy.  By 
competitiveness we mean the ability under present conditions of a country’s products to command world 
markets.  
 In contrast to comparative advantage, it is appropriate to talk meaningfully about international 
competitiveness both on the macro and micro level.  International competitiveness is a matter largely of 
costs: which country is able to deliver the product to the market most cheaply.  Contributing to costs are 
factors that directly affect input prices, such as exchange rates, domestic wages and material costs, and 
productivity, but also capabilities to produce goods of appropriate quality and meeting market 
specifications.  Transportation and communication costs, and trade barriers and trade strategy may all play 
a role. Competitiveness is not an equilibrium concept.  It represents a position at a point in time or its 
change over time.  Since adjustment on the product supply side is likely to be very slow—it takes many 
years to establish production facilities and export markets—competitiveness typically refers to a time of 
disequilibrium when a country can increase its share of export markets.  In other words, competitiveness  
often refers to dynamic rather than static perspectives. 
Common usage of the term, competitiveness, is usually broader than would be implied by a formal 
definition.  In particular, advocates for competitiveness often stress the role of sustained productivity 
growth in producing products that meet the test of international markets and that leads to higher living 
standards.  (Porter 1990, Competitiveness Policy Council, 1992).  It is in this context that the term has been 
embraced by politicians to represent the failures or successes of Western economies.  But, the ability to 
command world markets (for a time) does not necessarily imply higher living standards.  A country’s 
products may be competitive because it has undervalued its currency.  In that case, terms of trade may be 
unfavorable from a welfare point of view, goods may be exported cheaply in terms of the imports.  
 11
Nevertheless, the effects on trade and production are real, as are the necessary structural adjustments that 
go along with them.6 
In contrast to comparative advantage, it is appropriate to talk meaningfully about international 
competitiveness both on the macro and micro level.  At the macro level, a country’s exports may be highly 
competitive in the destination countries or in comparison with products originating in other countries.  That 
may reflect underlying factor cost and productivity considerations.  It may also reflect the current exchange 
rate, undervaluation or overvaluation, as well as tariffs, transportation costs and trade restrictions as well as 
product quality and specifications.  Competitiveness has dynamic attributes in the sense that, given 
resource environment, countries may become more competitive as a result of learning-by doing, 
assimilation of technology, capital accumulation, increasing scale of production, and policy intervention.  
Contrary to some thinking, it does make sense to think of a country’s aggregate competitiveness and about 
policies intended to advance its competitiveness. 
From a micro perspective as well, it is possible to ask whether certain industries are competitive in 
world markets.  This calls for a cost comparison, at a prevailing exchange rate, involving such factors as 
wages and capital costs, scale of production, and, of course, productivity. As we have noted in the 
discussion of comparative advantage, some industries will be more suited to an economy’s endowment of 
factors and skills than others.  A dynamic improvement in competitiveness may mean that the 
competitiveness of currently exporting industries improves or that new products, perhaps technologically 
more advanced ones, become competitive.  
 
Measurement of Competitiveness 
The measurement of international competitiveness may be approached from a “results” or from a 
“causes” perspective.  Results are basically export performance and the trade balance.  These are ex post 
                                                          
6 Paul Krugman (1994) criticizes the tendency to characterize competitiveness by imagining a nation “like a big corporation, 
competing in the world market place”, a saying attributed to President Clinton. He argues that competitiveness is “a dangerous 
obsession” since it may lead to policy choices that are not clearly in the national interest—for example protectionism when foreign 
goods “threaten” local producers.  He prefers an approach that looks only at productivity growth as a measure of national 
performance, but this ignores the key role that international trade (and competition) may play in driving productivity differences.  (See 
Cohen, 1994.) 
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concepts and do not ask “why”, though there is often an implied explanation.  Growth of exports, 
particularly growth that is more rapid than in other countries, implies competitiveness.  A positive trade 
balance is also frequently cited as a positive measure of competitiveness. Presumably, competitiveness 
reflects relative costs, but it may also be affected by product attributes and trade restrictions.  This may lead 
to confusion.  Thus, a country that is running a trade surplus, may be suffering outflows of capital and its 
undervalued exchange rate may make its exports competitive. It is not clear that this type of 
competitiveness is a good thing.  Alternatively, a trade deficit may follow from a country’s attractiveness to 
foreign investors whose capital inflow causes the exchange rate to be overvalued from the perspective of 
trade.  
A classical results measure, focused on particular industries, was Balassa’s “revealed comparative 
advantage”  (RCA) (Balassa, 1965), the share of a country’s exports of a specific product category (Xij) to 
its total exports (ΣiXij) as compared to the share of  total world exports of the specific category (ΣjXij) in 
world exports of all goods (ΣiΣjXij),  
(1)        RCAij = Xij/ /(ΣiXij)/ (ΣjXij)/ (ΣiΣjXij). 
Balassa relates RCA measures to such underlying factors as capital intensity and human resource 
development (Balassa, 1979). The RCAs are sector specific and static.  It is possible to make them dynamic 
by focusing on comparisons over time and in terms of rates of change.  For example, growth of a specific 
export more rapidly than world wide growth of the specific product exports suggests competitiveness in the 
specific product.7  Such a dynamic comparison is shown in Table 4, above. 
 One may want to measure international competitiveness directly, seeking the causes for of a country’s 
or an industry’s international trade success.  The exchange rate is, of course, the most immediate measure 
of the terms of trade. However, the nominal exchange rate, though relevant to trade transactions, fails to 
take into account differences in domestic currency production costs.  Comparisons of the temporal 
movement of real exchange rates can be computed by adjusting changes in nominal exchange rates for the 
underlying domestic price movements.  
                                                          
7 Other approaches to measure competitiveness, the Michaely index, a measure of relative net exports, or the Χ2 measure focus on somewhat different questions like 
trade balance and specialization (Laursen, 1998)  
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It is more difficult to establish comparisons of real competitiveness at a point in time in absolute terms, 
since they depend on the absolute levels of domestic input costs (or prices) and on productivity.  Can the 
product be produced more cheaply in one country than in another? The basic ingredients for such a 
comparison need to be the exchange rate and the underlying costs in the trading countries.  There are 
several possibilities: 
• comparison of wage rates or capital costs, 
• comparison of unit labor or unit capital costs, and 
• comparison of unit total costs. 
In each case, comparisons must be made in terms of currencies adjusted at nominal exchange rates since 
these rates apply to goods sold in international trade.  Comparisons of wage rates or capital costs alone fail 
to allow for differences in productivity. And the differences due to production technology and its 
adaptation to local conditions are critical.  Thus, factor cost computations call for unit cost comparisons.  
One may compare relative wages and relative productivities to ascertain competitiveness, for example:  
  (1)      (l/q ) * w  >< (lf/qf) * wf / XR 
where (l/q) represents unit labor input, w represents the wage rate, the subscript  f stands for the outside 
world and XR is the exchange rate (units of domestic currency per dollar).  Given the exchange rate, one 
may determine labor competitiveness for individual industries on the basis of unit labor output statistics for 
separate industries.  
 Multifactor cost comparisons pose additional problems since the weights attached to the factor 
inputs are likely to differ between countries because of differences in relative factor cost.   Production at 
different sites is likely to use different combinations of labor and capital: lots of labor where labor is cheap 
and capital expensive and capital intensive methods where capital is relatively cheap. That is, after all, what 
comparative advantage is all about.  In that case, the total unit cost comparison should use the factor 
weights appropriate for each of the economies, i.e. 
(2) ((l/q) * w) * W + ((k/q) * r) * (1 – W)  >< (((lf/qf) * wf) * Wf + (kf/qf) * rf) * (1 – Wf)) / XR  
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 where  k represents capital,  r is the interest rate, and W stands for the labor share of inputs.8  An added 
complication lies in the need to allow for intermediate inputs, sometimes coming from foreign sources. 
The comparisons based on a single input, labor or capital, are feasible so long as appropriate data on 
wages or interest rates and data on output or on labor or capital productivity can be developed.  Multi factor 
comparisons are more difficult because of the need for appropriate weights. 
It is possible to approximate a multifactor comparison by making use of data from international 
comparison programs like the International Comparison Project (ICP) at the University of Pennsylvania 
and the International Comparisons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) of the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre.  The ICP work takes a final expenditure approach to purchasing power parity.  It .has 
a long and distinguished history going back to Gilbert and Kravis (1954), Summers and Heston (1991) at 
the University of Pennsylvania, and more recently at the World Bank in association with other international 
organization.  Survey-based prices for fully described comparable items in final demand, so-called 
specification pricing, are used to translate final demand components in the comparison country to US dollar 
values. The computation yields estimates for GDP in PPP $.   
(3) GDPPPP$j = Σi(Qio * PijPPP$ ) / Popj 
These can be compared with GDP on an exchange rate basis, sometimes called the Atlas method, 
(4)  GDPXRj =Σi(Qio * Pij  ) /Popj / XRj.  
The comparison between per capita GDP in PPP$ and on the basis of the exchange rate yields a measure of 
exchange rate over or undervaluation (U): 
(5)    Uj = GDPXRj/GDPppp$j  =  Σi(Qio * Pij  )/ XRj / Popj / Σi(Qio * Pij /PRiPPP$) / Popj  = XRjPPP$  / XRj  
where GDPppp$j and GDPXRJ are GDP per capita in  purchasing power terms (prices are in PPP$) and in 
exchange rate terms (prices are in local currency but the total has been divided by the exchange rate), 
respectively.   Popj represents population.  The Qios are quantities.  The quantity weights in this calculation 
differ greatly between the countries.  It has been customary to use a Fisher average between estimates 
based on comparison country quantity weights and base country (usually the US) weights. 
                                                          
8 Note that even though the weights (W) are country specific, there is no index number problem here.  The comparison is between the 
cost of producing in one country and in another using the locally appropriate mix of labor and capital. 
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   This approach provides a comprehensive measure of undervaluation based on a detailed appraisal 
of prices and on all inputs into the production process. However, for purposes of evaluating costs, a 
problem with this approach lies in the price measures.  These are expenditure prices, since the purpose of 
the PPP comparison is to compare final output per capita.  If PPP is to be used for productivity comparisons 
or production costs, the comparison should rather use input prices. Further difficulties are that the weights 
applied to the price measures may not be appropriate for production of traded commodities, and the 
quantity weights are not likely to be appropriate either for the base country or the comparison country.  
Indeed, one would like to use weights based on production inputs rather than on consumption.9    Finally, 
detailed surveys  have not available for some countries, including China! In this case, regression methods 
are used to estimate a statistic for China on the basis of related countries.  This represents a serious 
shortcoming. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of data on production structure and input prices, there is much to be 
said for such a measure.  It represents a quick way to measure the undervaluation of a country’s currency 
with respect to the nominal exchange rate, and it provides a rough benchmark for intertemporal studies on 
the movement of real exchange rates.  Assuming that wages and GDP per capita are proportional, the 
measure may be thought of as single factor indicator of competitiveness. Alternatively, since it deals with a 
broad mix of products whose production calls for labor and capital and the resulting per capita income, it 
may also be seen as a multifactor comparison.  
The sectoral value added approach also has a long history going back to Paige and Bombach 
(1959).  The recent work under the auspices of ICOP has simplified the procedures and extended them to 
many country comparisons including ones for China (van Ark and Timmer, 2001, and Bai et al, 2001). This 
strategy is based on comparisons of producing sectors  on the basis of industrial census data. Relative unit 
value indexes (UVR) by sector, computed by dividing sectoral value added by measures of quantity, are 
used to deflate sectoral output and to produce aggregates GDP in PPP terms for each sector, i.e..   
(6)  GDPppp$j    =  Σi (wiVAij /(UVij /UVio) 
                                                          
9 For a discussion see Kravis, Summers, and Heston  ( 1978 ), and Summers and Heston (1996 ) and the many papers of the Penn 
International Comparison Project. 
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where the VAij  are sectoral value addeds in the comparison country j,  UVij and UVio are the sectoral unit 
value indexes in country j and in the base country o respectively.  The weights (wi) are  sectoral weights 
either for the comparison country or for the base country.  These may be looked at separately or they are 
frequently combined with a Fisher index procedure.   As in the expenditure based procedure, 
undervaluation can be computed by comparing the PPP based measure with the exchange rate based 
measure. 
 There are things to be said in favor and against the sectoral value added approach.  The chief 
objections are that it makes use of unit values rather than prices for explicitly defined products and that in 
simplified procedures it uses sectoral ouputs rather than subtracting intermediate inputs, a likely source of 
errors.  On the other hand, the sectoral approach has the advantage that it allows comparisons at the 
industry level.  Moreover, these comparisons can be made directly between unit values in local currency 
and in US dollars, producing a sector specific implied exchange rate.  This is a considerable advantage for 
evaluating competitiveness.  
 It is important also to note that there are important aspects of competitiveness that are not captured 
by either approach.  These include costs of delivering products to world markets, including transportation, 
communication and coordination costs, as well as policy-related barriers or incentives to trade.  In many 
countries government policy has favored export-oriented development, which may give a competitive edge 
to export enterprises.  At the same time, market opening, for example the increasing presence of foreign 
firms in China that is set to take place now that China has been admitted to the WTO, gives extra incentives 
for foreign firms to set up production facilities in anticipation of greater market access in the future.  Direct 
foreign investment is likely to be the most important contribution to competitiveness through the 
introduction of  new production methods, world market product specifications,  and advanced management 
procedures. These are measured only indirectly in the comparative price or unit value relatives data. 
  Determinants of Chinese Competitiveness 
 We apply the discussion above to measure the determinants of Chinese competitiveness. It is 
necessary to look at a variety of measures and to infer how they explain the competitiveness of Chinese 
products. As we have noted at issue is  the role of the  exchange rate versus other factors in explaining 
Chinese competitiveness. 
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 Revealed Comparative Advantage 
A picture of rapidly increasing Chinese competitiveness is apparent if we compute a dynamic form 
of  revealed comparative advantage (RCA), comparing the growth rate of world trade of a specific country 
to the growth rate of world exports (Table 6).  Note that an RCA in excess of one suggests that a country is 
competitive in world markets, i.e. that its share of world exports has been increasing.  China is above 1, 
close to 2 in the 1980 to 1995 period.  China’s exports grew at a rate many times the global average growth 
during 2000-2002.  Significantly, we can see a systematic decline in the RCAs of most East Asian countries 
(except Taiwan, which is heavily specialized in electronics,) beginning in 1995, with sharply negative 
numbers for all during 2000-2002, except of course for China.  It is important to note, however, that 
revealed comparative advantage is an ex post measure, demonstrating but not explaining the underlying 
trends. 
Table 6: Dynamic RCAs 1970-2002 
(annual % change in country exports/annual % change in world exports) 
      
 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1995 1995-20002000-2002
      
China 1.11 2.19 2.14 2.24 19.09
Hong Kong 1.11 2.57 1.84 0.65 -0.64
 
S. Korea 1.66 2.33 1.60 1.40 -4.03
Malaysia 1.01 1.73 2.27 1.23 -7.80
Philippines 0.93 0.62 1.89 3.58 -13.97
Thailand 1.20 2.25 2.19 0.88 -4.24
Singapore 1.34 1.78 1.98 0.67 -6.82
Indonesia 1.68 0.03 1.40 1.36 -5.59
Taiwan 1.42 2.39 0.94 1.23 -12.48
      
Japan 1.03 1.40 1.06 0.34 -9.81
US 0.89 0.99 0.97 1.26 -8.41
Computed from IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 The Exchange Rate 
The nominal exchange rate is typically the rate relied on for evaluating trade transactions and is 
often the target for exchange rate pegging between different currencies, the RMB yuan to the dollar for 
example. But longer term decisions about importing and exporting, or about foreign sourcing of production, 
must be based on a real exchange rate that takes into account changes in domestic prices as well.  Figure 2 
shows real exchange rates adjusted for inflation differentials between East Asian countries and the United 
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States.10    The graph shows the paths of real exchange rates from their initial levels normalized to 100 in 
l992.   
The 1994 devaluation of the Chinese currency from 5.8 to 8.3 RMB yuan per US dollar is often 
seen as a critical factor responsible for the extraordinary growth of Chinese exports.  Note how the decline 
of the Chinese exchange rate preceded the devaluations of other East Asian exchange rates in 1997-98.  
Some have argued that the Chinese devaluation reduced the competitiveness of other East Asian countries 
and precipitated the 1997 crisis.  In fact the 1994 devaluation was principally an alignment of official rates 
to market rates at which most exports were already being priced.  The mid 1990s, when Chinese exports 
grew so greatly, marks the time when factories in Shenzhen and Guangdong were being equipped to 
produce quality products for the world market.  It is not possible to determine to what extent China’s export 
record during this period represents the result of capital investments or management by foreign (often Hong 
Kong or Taiwanese) entrepreneurs or simply of assimilation of technology or learning-by-doing.   
After the 1997 crisis other exchange rates in East Asia adjusted downward, and exchange rates throughout 
the region are now generally aligned with that of China as they were in 1992 before China's devaluation   
The exceptions are Hong Kong and Singapore, whose currencies have risen relative to 1992 parities, and 
Indonesia, which depreciated by a much greater extent than other regional currencies.  For the region as a 
whole, the figures suggest that a decline in the exchange rate of some 40 to 50 percent. 
The result is striking in that for China and most other East Asian countries the real exchange rate in 2002 
was about half its level of ten years earlier.  In other words, Chinese and other East Asian exports have 
been supported by a substantial real depreciation of their currency exchange rates11. 
 
                                                          
10 For reasons of consistent coverage, deflation was done on the basis of the CPI.  Alternative measures of prices, more appropriate in 
this case, gave approximately the same results. Comparison against the Japanese yen and the Euro would show even greater 
depreciation for the Chinese and East Asian currencies since the US dollar has depreciated relative to the yen and the Euro. These data 
show the same patterns as the nominal rates, though perhaps a little more strongly since the US inflation rate was higher on average 
than in most of the East Asian countries.   
11 Comparison against the Japanese yen and the Euro would show less depreciation until 2002 because the US dollar appreciated.  
But in the past year, the US dollar depreciation  relative to the yen and the Euro means the RMB and other East Asian currencies have 
depreciated more against other world currencies..  
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Figure 2 
The discussion above deals with the changes in competitiveness over time.  An important question is 
the level at a given point in time.  In this sense, there is little disagreement that the RMB yuan is 
undervalued, the question is by how much.  International comparisons of purchasing power have long 
indicated that for many developing countries per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis 
yields much higher figures than the corresponding comparison based on nominal exchange rates (Summers 
and Heston, 1991).  (Figure 3)  
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Figure 3: Relationship between GDI per 
capita and PPP Income/Xr Income, 2001
(data from Table 5)
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 Though developing countries have very low incomes in comparison to the United States and other 
advanced countries when translated into dollars at market exchange rates, the disparity is not as large when 
adjusted for differences in local purchasing power.  For China, the discrepancy between market and PPP-
adjusted income is extreme—exchange rate-based GNI per capita is $890, compared with PPP-adjusted 
GNI per person of $4,260—a factor of 4.8 to 1.  This represents an undervaluation of 79% (World Bank, 
2001 figures).  This implies an equilibrium rate of exchange of perhaps 2.7 renminbi per dollar rather than  
        
  Table 5:  Income per Capita:  
  Exchange Rate and PPP Basis and Undervaluation  
  $XRbasis $PPPbasis Undervaluation % 
China  890 4,260 79% 
S. Korea  9,400 18,110 48% 
Malaysia  3,640 8,340 56% 
Philippines 1,050 4,360 76% 
Thailand  1,970 6,550 70% 
Singapore  24,740 24,910 1% 
Indonesia  680 2,940 77% 
Vietnam  410 2,130 81% 
Cambodia  270 1,520 82% 
Laos  310 1,610 81% 
   
    
Japan  35,990 27,430 -31% 
US  34,870 34,870 0% 
Source:World Bank data   
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8.3 RMB yuan per dollar, its recent pegged value.  In other words, each RMB yuan is worth 58 cents rather 
than its pegged exchange rate of 12 cents.  By this measure, China’s undervaluation is considerably greater 
than in many other East Asian countries, although the poorest economies (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) 
and those at the heart of the 1997 Asian financial crisis show similar degrees of undervaluatuion. 
Turning to the alternate unit value approach, sectoral unit value ratios (Table 6) compare the unit 
value of output in the total manufacturing and in major production sectors between China and the United 
States.  The unit value ratios are simply the value per unit of  sectoral real output in RMB yuan in China 
divided by the corresponding  unit value per unit of real output in the US measured in US dollars. 
 
 
 
 Table 6 Unit Value Ratios by Manufacturing Branch  China/US 199512  
  At Chinese weights At US weights Average  Undervaluation Relative Price Level
        (100 assuming 8.35y=US$) 
Food and Kindred Products 5.8  5.8  5.8  69.9  
Textile Mill Products 3.9  5.3  4.6  54.6  
Wearing apparel 3.4  5.7  4.4  52.7  
Leather Products and footwear 2.2  2.2  2.2  26.7  
Wood products 2.3  3.7  2.9  34.5  
Paper products, Printing & publ. 5.5  5.2  5.4  64.1  
Chemicals and allied products 7.1  7.8  7.4  89.2  
Petroleum and coal products 7.9  8.1  8  95.5  
Rubber and plastic products 6.8  7  6.9  82.5  
Non-metallic mineral products 2.4  1.7  2  23.9  
Basic metal products 5.3  7.3  6.2  74.6  
Fabricated metal products 2  6.4  3.6  43.3  
Machinery and equipment 1.5  2.5  1.9  23.0  
Transport equipment 1  1  1  11.8  
Office, acct. computing machinery 2.5  6.6  4.1  48.5  
Electrical machinery and equip. 3  3.3  3.2  37.8  
Other manufacturing equipment 4.2  4.8  4.5  53.9  
           
Total manufacturing 4.2  4.8  4.5  53.9  
          
Source:Bai et al p.49 
                                                          
12 It is unfortunate that the calculation is not more up to date. The authors indicate that they have not yet updated the information but 
relative values are not likely to be greatly changed. 
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 That means, for example, that the unit value (approximately one could say price) of a unit of food 
and kindred products is 5.8  RMB yuan in China for every dollar  in the United States.  That figure can be 
compared to an exchange rate of 8.3 RMB yuan to the dollar to measure undervaluation, as in the last 
column of the table. As in the PPP comparison, substantial undervaluation of the  yuan is apparent, though 
not as large in most industries as the PPP figures suggest.  However, note that the results differ greatly by 
sector.  The degree of undervaluation is greatest precisely in products that have heavy weights in Chinese 
export trade: leather goods, wood products, machinery and equipment. Textiles and wearing apparel show a 
unit value ratio indicating undervaluation near 50 percent.  Not surprisingly, products where China is a net 
importer, petroleum and chemicals, for example, are almost fully valued according to the exchange rate.13 
Unfortunately, sectoral comparisons of unit value ratios with competing East Asian exporters are not 
available. 
Labor Costs 
As we suggested above, an advantage of the PPP exchange rate or unit value comparisons is that to 
provides a ready though approximate “multifactor” measure of currency under- or overvaluation.  But since 
PPP  or unit value comparisons are based on surveys of domestic prices, they are imperfect measures of 
costs of Chinese products actually delivered to world markets, where market prices in a world currency 
such as the U.S. dollar are relevant.  While comparative information on production structures and input 
costs is not available, clearly wages represent a key cost ingredient.  Chinese wages are extremely low by 
world standards and in comparison with most, but not all, East Asian countries.     
Annual manufacturing earnings for China and several other developing Asian economies are shown in 
US dollars on an exchange rate basis in Figure 4.  China’s  annual wages averaged in RMB 8750 in 2000, 
just over $US 1,000.   Chinese wages in dollars have been increasing rapidly (15% per year in 2001 and 
2002), and in some parts of China where exports originate—such as Shanghai, Fujian, and Guangdong 
provinces—they are higher than the national average, by a factor of 2.  Still, overall manufacturing wages 
remain well below those in the Philippines and Thailand.  Only post-crisis Indonesia and Vietnam  have 
lower wages.  Considering that United States manufacturing wages average  over $25,000 on an annual 
                                                          
13 According to the author, the statistic recorded for transport equipment is based on only one observation 
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basis, it is not surprising that many products can be produced in China at much lower cost than in the 
United States.14  
 The wage differentials that favor production in East Asia, and specifically in China, have persisted for 
many years and, consequently, do not provide a single factor explanation for the  recent upsurge of Chinese 
exports..  In recent years there has been rapid increase in wages, particularly of skilled workers and in the 
export-intensive provinces like Guangdong.  However, China’s enormous rural population and increasing 
numbers of “floating” urban workers suggest that it will be many years before the supply of low cost 
unskilled labor runs out. 
Other cost considerations are more difficult to measure than wages.  It is well known that 
transportation cost have been coming down for many years—air freight, for example—and trade barriers 
are set to be reduced with China’s entry to the WTO.15   
                                                          
14 Differences in productivity likely offset some, but not all, of these cost advantages.  While aggregate labor productivity has been 
estimated at 3-7% of US levels, it is purportedly much higher in foreign-financed  and joint venture enterprises that are important 
exporters.  (See UNCTAD, 2002; Szirmai and Ruoen, 2000; Wu, 2001. ) Sectoral level data is sketchy, but productivity also appears 
to be higher in key export industries, such as footwear, apparel and electrical machinery.  Bai, Ren and Szirmai (2001) report 1995 
estimates for these industries ranging from 6-13% of US levels.  
15 Hummels (1999) provides evidence that transportation costs overall have not declined in the post-war period, casting doubt on their 
role in explaining global trade growth.  However, he does find sharp declines in air transport costs which helped to propel the strong 
growth in that sector. 
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Fig. 4 Average Annual Earnings in Manufacturing (US$)
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Foreign Direct Investment as a  Determinant of Competitiveness 
A critical consideration for competitiveness is supplying products that meet world market 
specifications with respect to design, quality and technological content.  This represented an important step 
in the growing competitiveness of Chinese industry.  Prior to the 1990s, China was selling simple goods of 
relatively low quality.  Since then, in part as a result of the intervention of foreign investors from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan and more recently from Europe, North America, and Japan, China has become a focus 
for foreign direct investment.  China offers a special advantage over other East Asian countries in that 
many foreign producers view their entry as export producers in China only as first step, hoping ultimately 
also to sell in the huge and growing Chinese domestic market (Park and Lee, 2003).  Others, like the 
automobile industry are producing for the domestic market, with the ultimate objective of  also using China 
as an export platform.  
 25
Foreign firms begin by setting up subsidiaries or joint ventures in China to produce products for their 
home markets.16  These have to meet world specifications and quality requirements.  Increasingly, they are 
also raising the level of technology.  As a result, Chinese goods have become highly competitive in 
Western markets and account for a growing market share.  Frequently, the relationships within a 
geographic industrial cluster enable Chinese domestic firms to develop products comparable to those being 
sold in the world market,  to apply internationally-used technologies, and to draw on experienced workers 
and suppliers. Learning to produce and economies of scale enable Chinese producers to improve their 
production efficiency.  
Foreign direct investment has been a critical consideration in improving China’s ability to produce 
goods for the world market. China has been the dominant recipient of foreign direct investment in East 
Asia receiving almost $50 billion of FDI annually (China and Hong Kong combined $74 billion in 2001), 
approximately 50 percent of FDI inflows into the East Asian region.. (Table 7)17 an important factor not 
only for capital flows but also for flows of technology and management skills. The bulk of this FDI is 
going into export industries in the eastern seaboard of China, particularly Guangdong. 
 Table 7    
     
Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia 1998-2001 
 (millions of US $)   
     
  1998 1999 2000 2001
China 43,751 38,753 38,399 52,344
Hong Kong   14,765 24,581 61,938 22,834
South Korea 5,412 9,333 9,283 8,893
Taiwan  222 2,926 4,928 4,109
Indonesia  -356 -2,745 -4,550 -1,446
Malaysia   2,163 3,895 3,788 3,549
Philippines   2,287 573 1,241 1,621
Singapore   6,389 11,803 5,407 8,609
   
Thailand  7,315 6,213 3,366 5,791
Viet Nam 1,671 1,412 1,298 2,191
Source: ADB 
                                                          
16 For a contrary view of Chinese success in attracting FDI see Huang (2003), who argues that the surge in FDI reflects the barriers 
facing China’s domestic private firms which make them uncompetitive compared with foreign multinationals. 
17 Next to the United States, China has become the world’s largest FDI recipient. 
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It is possible to link statistically the relationship between direct foreign investment and China’s 
export prowess.  In Figure 5, data on FDI and exports by province of Chin (1999) show a remarkable 
relationship.18 The role of Guangdong province is dominant with 30 percent of China’s FDI imports and 40 
percent of Chinese exports 
.
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The geographic linkage between the level of foreign direct investment into the eastern provinces 
of China and these regions as a source of China’s exports is unmistakable. Foreign investors not only 
provide capital.  In most cases, they are responsible for technical and managerial skills and often they 
provide foreign markets as well. These firms integrate their Chinese operations into a value chain that 
extends into the world economy. (Ng and Yeats, 2003)  Many of the foreign investment projects take the 
form of joint ventures with Chinese partners.  The partner firms inform themselves of foreign technology 
and frequently take advantage of it to promote their own projects.19   
                                                          
18 The estimated equation is Ln(ex) = 1.917 + .908 Ln(FDI)   R2  = .802. Similar results can be obtained from a cross country.                                                            
                                                          (.08) 
regression for East Asia. 
 
19 Correspondence with a Chinese business consultant. He points out that using world technology the Bird brand of telephone 
handsets has gained the number 1 position in China 
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Chinese products today meet world specifications and quality requirements.  Increasingly, they are 
also raising their level of technology.   
The changing nature of inward foreign direct investment points to China’s evolving role as a high-
tech producer.  Table 7 shows the share of electronics-related FDI inflows of total FDI from three countries 
for which industrially-detailed data are available, US, Japan and Taiwan’s approved FDI flows via Hong 
Kong. (Hong Kong itself is the single largest provider of FDI to mainland China, but detailed data are not 
available for these flows.)  The data show a growing share of inward FDI in electronics and related 
components.  For both Taiwan and  the US, in particular, this share more than doubled in recent years. 
 
Table 7 Electronics-Related Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to China (% of Total FDI) 
  
Taiwan's Hong Kong Indirect 
Mainland Investment 
US Net FDI outflows to 
China Japan Net FDI Outflows to China  
YEAR      
Electronics & 
electrical appliances 
% share     
Electronics and 
electronic 
components % 
share    
Electrical 
Equipment % 
share  
1989-97        18.2*    31.1**   19.4*
 1998      38.6    42.6    11.8  
 1999      42.9    33.2    9.7  
 2000      56.2    58.5    32.2  
 2001      45.1    82.9    35.3  
 2002      39.0        17.7  
                        
 Notes:  In Millions of US dollars. *1989-97 total, **1991-
97 total.        
 
Source: Computed:  China inward FDI from 
UNCTAD        
 
Hong Kong indirect mainland investment from HK report, "Statistics on Approved Indirect Mainland Investment by Year 
and Area" 
 US Net FDI outflows from US BEA.       
 Japan outward FDI  from Ministry of Finance        
              
 
As a result, Chinese goods have become more technically sophisticated and have increasingly been  
accepted in Western markets.  Many of these products are made to specifications of developed country 
importers.  Some goods are produced by subsidiaries of large multinational trade mark firms.  Some 
Chinese firms have also begun to establish trade marks that are known and accepted in international 
markets (e.g. Haier, Konka, Huawei, and Legend).  
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It is not possible statistically to measure the qualitative improvements that have increased the 
competitiveness of Chinese products.  But, changes in the range of products being produced are suggestive 
of the developments that are taking place.20    
Other Factors Influencing Competitiveness 
Some authors have put heavy emphasis on cultural factors as promoters of East Asian growth and 
competitiveness (Harrison and Huntington, 2000)..This type of explanation that might be termed the “Asian 
values, Asian success” paradigm lacks explicit linkages to the practices of Asian entrepreneurs. (Adams 
and Vernon, 2004). In the Chinese case, the cultural argument for relating Asian success to Asian values is 
complicated by the fact that China is a transitional economy in which national and provincial governments 
still maintain a substantial stake in industry.  On the other hand, it may be argued that the turn toward the 
market economy has helped.  Moreover, the entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and elsewhere 
“overseas”, who have motivated and directed many of the new Chinese export ventures, share language and 
culture with the Chinese Mainland.   
Finally, there is a question of   export promoting policies.  The shift from a self-sufficiency to trade 
expansion was a central element of China’s modernization policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as has 
been the encouragement of FDI and private participation since then (Chow, 2002).  There are numerous 
advantages and incentives for exporting firms, including foreign trade zones (now extended from the East 
Coast to all of China), retention of earned foreign exchange, special tax concessions, etc. Moreover, foreign 
firms are encouraged to establish joint ventures with Chinese firms in order to receive approval for 
producing for the Chinese market. These policies have undoubtedly encouraged FDI and have facilitated 
the development of export business.  On the other hand, such policies are typical of  the East Asian region 
as has been the opening of world trading potentials through reductions in tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions.  These policy related developments are likely a factor but not a complete explanation for 
China’s recent export competitiveness. 
 
 
                                                          
20 Among recent articles that have documented China’s export gains in capital-intensive and high tech export markets are Wong and 
Chan (2002), Chen (2001), and Voon and Yue (2003). 
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Evaluation 
 What do these informational elements suggest about the causes of China’s competitiveness and export 
growth?  The explanation clearly cannot be mono-causal.  China’s export competitiveness hinges on the 
coincidence of several factors: the favorable exchange rate, low wages and available supplies of unskilled 
labor, the reduced cost of communication and transportation, the flow of foreign direct investment and 
foreign management and its implications for China’s productive abilities, the large scale of the potential 
Chinese domestic market, the opening of world markets, and the encouragement of Chinese foreign trade 
policy.  
On the other hand, certain considerations have special importance.  For example, Chinese export 
growth is more than a matter of low wages and an undervalued exchange rate.  Appreciating the exchange 
rate, even by substantial amounts, is not likely to greatly diminish Chinese competitiveness.  China’s huge 
pool of cheap and increasingly mobile labor means that even with exchange rate readjustment, 
competitiveness based on low labor costs will be maintained for quite some time.  Chinese competition 
may also further displace some low-cost export production in other parts of the world, East Asia or Mexico, 
for example, although in East Asia most regional exchange rates have adjusted back in line with that of 
China prevailing in the early 1990s. 
Secondly, Chinese producers have become greatly more proficient at meeting world requirements for 
quality and product design.  The large inflow of foreign direct investment and entrepreneurship, which is 
responsible for much of the export flow, has facilitated this process, and , in turn, reflects the  favorable 
economics of export production in China.  The shift of Chinese production toward more advanced products 
with technological content is also notable.  On one hand, this represents competition with other East Asian 
countries.  On the other, it reflects a collaborative symbiotic relationship with South Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan whose cost structure has outgrown the simpler high technology goods that supported earlier phases 
of their industrialization.   
China’s competitive ace in the hole continues to be its large and potentially mammoth domestic 
market.  Foreign firms seek entry to China not only to take advantage of low cost export platforms, but also 
as a way to position themselves for future local sales.  Aside perhaps for India, there is simply no other 
developing economy with such  promise as a  market. 
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What are the implications for the U.S. and China’s competitors of China’s growing international 
market prowess?  
   An artificially undervalued  RMB yuan would be a serious matter. since the resulting adjustments in 
production  and trade would not be consistent with long-term comparative advantage.  Moreover, artificial 
undervaluation is likely not in China’s best interests, since  it increases the cost of imported goods in China 
and lessens competitive pressures from abroad that help to raise Chinese productivity..  
On the other hand, Even if the RMB yuan were significantly appreciated, patterns of trade will  
continue change in favor of China.  .For the U.S., specialization away from labor-intensive or low-
technology products is inevitable and in the nation’s overall interest. Structural adjustment among and 
within industries is painful and the impact on employment and wages represents an issue politically.  For 
other East Asian countries, appreciation of China’s RMB yuan would help competitively, but these 
countries too make their biggest gains up the development ladder by upgrading their production into more 
advanced products. 
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